



25X1



Copy No. C

0

El-11

25X1



CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
RELATING TO NATIONAL SECURITY

State Department review completed



25X1

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING
AND DECLASSIFICATION

25X1

Approved For Release 2003/01/29 : CIA-RDP79T00975A008000070001-5

Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt

Approved For Release 2003/01/29 : CIA-RDP79T00975A008000070001-5

25X1

Approved For Release 2003/01/29 : CIA-RDP79T00975A008000070001-5

9 November 1964

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

CONTENTS

25X1

-
2. Communist China - USSR: Peiping statements reaffirm hard line on Sino-Soviet issues. (Page 3)
 3. Bolivia: The junta plans to strengthen itself against any future power play by leftist forces. (Page 5)
 4. Japan: Eisaku Sato, the new prime minister, is not expected to make any abrupt policy changes. (Page 6)
 5. Notes: France-UN; Sudan. (Page 7)

25X1

25X1

Approved For Release 2003/01/29 : CIA-RDP79T00975A008000070001-5

25X1

Approved For Release 2003/01/29 : CIA-RDP79T00975A008000070001-5

Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt

Approved For Release 2003/01/29 : CIA-RDP79T00975A008000070001-5

25X1

Communist China - USSR: [REDACTED]

25X1

[REDACTED] Peiping will/continue to take a hard line in negotiations with the new Soviet leaders.

25X1

25X1

25X1

[REDACTED] dismissed the possibility of Chinese compromise with the Soviets. He declared that Peiping would not reduce its demands and that the "only solution" would be for the Soviets to return to old revolutionary principles.]

25X1

[REDACTED] Peiping would insist on a positive Soviet gesture, such as withdrawal of military aid to India, as the price of a rapprochement. He indicated that Peiping was not optimistic of immediate success.]

25X1

This view is [also] implied by the condescending and uncompromising tone of Chinese propaganda issued in connection with the Soviet 7 November anniversary. A People's Daily editorial on 6 November lectured the new Soviet leadership on its responsibilities and reminded it that support of revolutionary struggle throughout the world is the "unshirkable duty" of those who have already established socialist states.

Noting that the Soviet "people" supported this principle, the editorial declared that Khrushchev had failed in this regard. The editorial--Peiping's first official reference to Khrushchev's downfall--warned that anyone following his revisionist course would inevitably be overthrown in turn.


Pointedly withholding approval of the new leaders, People's Daily asserted that modern revisionism was

(continued)

25X1

"still the main danger." Peng Chen, a senior member of the politburo, in a speech on 7 November reaffirmed Peiping's position that opposition to US "imperialism" was an essential hallmark of a true Communist. Those who attempted to obscure this vital point, he said, "either have been or are being repudiated."

25X1



Bolivia: The strategy of the junta is to buy time until it is strong enough to resist a play for power by leftist forces.

Minister of Economy Colonel Julio Sanjines Goitia told a US Embassy official recently that the size of the military will be increased considerably. This, Goitia contends, will put the junta in a strong enough position to tear up any agreements it might have to make with opposition groups for political expediency, and will give it a military edge if the opposition makes an attempt to gain power by armed conflict.

25X1


[The Communist Party (PCB) has no plans for armed action at the moment, [REDACTED]

25X1

[REDACTED] The party's objective is to form a popular leftist front with former vice president Juan Lechin's National Leftist Revolutionary Party, if possible, in order to achieve political power. PCB leaders view the labor movement as the primary target for infiltration. Lechin has already started to consolidate and increase his support among labor elements.] [REDACTED]

25X1

25X1



Japan: Eisaku Sato, selected by Japan's ruling conservative party to succeed Hayato Ikeda as prime minister and party president, will probably not make any abrupt policy changes.

Sato is generally associated with the more conservative wing of the party, which has stressed close cooperation with the US. He would presumably go beyond Ikeda to push positively for a greater Japanese contribution to the joint defense of his country. [REDACTED]

25X1

25X1

Sato has been a champion of closer ties with Taiwan. However, he cannot be expected to flout public opinion on the question of expediting "non-political" contacts with Asian Communist countries, a policy highly popular in Japan.

Sato's style and probable approach are likely to provoke much stronger opposition than has the "low posture" of his predecessor. Sato has indicated that he would prefer a short, vigorous tenure to a long, comparatively unspectacular incumbency such as he feels Ikeda has had. [REDACTED]

25X1

25X1

25X1

Approved For Release 2003/01/29 : CIA-RDP79T00975A008000070001-5

NOTES

France--UN: [De Gaulle intends to have the French UN delegation introduce a motion in favor of seating Communist China in the General Assembly and the Security Council, [redacted]

25X1

25X1

[redacted] De Gaulle hopes to line up crucial African backing, and two French officials have reportedly been abroad to try to garner support. De Gaulle may be planning to announce French intentions through either a press conference or a televised statement sometime this month. [redacted]

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

9 Nov 64

DAILY BRIEF

7

25X1


Approved For Release 2003/01/29 : CIA-RDP79T00975A008000070001-5

25X1

Sudan: The new government has repealed most of the repressive measures of the former military regime, but the press and the Communists are demanding more purges. The Communists are reported to have assumed an increasingly influential role in all cabinet deliberations. The government will be plagued, as the previous one was, by the demands of southern dissidents for greater autonomy--demands which the Communists support, but which most of the other ministers probably are unwilling to satisfy fully.

25X1

25X1



25X1

9 Nov 64

DAILY BRIEF

8

Approved For Release 2003/01/29 : CIA-RDP79T00975A008000070001-5

THE PRESIDENT

Executive Offices of the White House

Special Counsel to the President

The Special Assistant for National Security Affairs

The Scientific Adviser to the President

The Director of the Budget

The Department of State

The Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

The Counselor and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council

The Director of Intelligence and Research

The Treasury Department

The Secretary of the Treasury

The Under Secretary of the Treasury

The Department of Defense

The Secretary of Defense

The Deputy Secretary of Defense

The Secretary of the Army

The Secretary of the Navy

The Secretary of the Air Force

The Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs)

The Assistant Secretary of Defense

The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff

Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy

Chief of Staff, United States Air Force

Chief of Staff, United States Army

Commandant, United States Marine Corps

U.S. Rep., Military Committee and Standing Group, NATO

Supreme Allied Commander, Europe

Commander in Chief, Pacific

Commander in Chief, Atlantic

The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency

The Director, The Joint Staff

The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army

The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy

The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force

The Department of Justice

The Attorney General

The Federal Bureau of Investigation

The Director

National Aeronautics and Space Administration

The Administrator

The Atomic Energy Commission

The Chairman

The National Security Agency

The Director

The United States Information Agency

The Director

The National Indications Center

The Director

Approved For Release 2003/01/29 : CIA-RDP79T00975A008000070001-5

Approved For Release 2003/01/29 : CIA-RDP79T00975A008000070001-5

~~TOP SECRET~~

Approved For Release 2003/01/29 : CIA-RDP79T00975A008000070001-5

~~TOP SECRET~~